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The Concept of the Scheme in the Activity Theories of Il’enkov and Piaget 
Pentti Määttänen

Evald Ilyenkov and Jean Piaget use the concept of the scheme in their theories of human mind. Scheme means for both of them general form or structure of action. Their conceptions have also at least partially common roots in the history of thought. There are also interesting connections between Ilyenkov’s and Piaget’s schematism and the pragmatism of Charles Peirce and John Dewey. The analysis of these views gives outlines for a theory of mind that is relevant also for contemporary debates in cognitive science. There is growing interest in theories of mind that don’t consider mind a property of the brain or even the body but a property of the concrete interaction between biological organisms and their environment.

Evald Ilyenkov on the concept of the scheme

The relation between thought and world is one of the perennial problems in philosophy. Benedict Spinoza’s original contribution to this issue is, according to Il’enkov, the appeal to the motion and activity of the human body as the crucial element of the solution. A human being, a thinking body, is able to accommodate its motion to the form of any other body. The form or scheme of the activity (motion) corresponds to the form of the object. For example, a hand moving along a round object is circular activity. The scheme of activity is also called way or manner of action (sposob deistvij). (Ilyenkov 1984, 37-40; habit of action is also a possible translation here because habituality is involved in Ilyenkov’s notion of scheme). The active body reveals the true nature of the objects in the world, and the more active the body is, the more universal it is (ibid., 53). This entails that language is not the only manifestation of thought. The mode of existence of thinking is the activity of the body in the world.

Maybe the most important consequence of this is the consistent questioning of the dichotomy of internal and external that is typical for modern philosophy. Mind is not something internal as opposed to the “external” world. The correct unit of analysis in investigating cognition is not the brain nor even the body, but how the body acts in the system formed by the thinking body and nature as a whole (ibid., 42). As Felix Mikhailov puts it: “My ‘mental’ is above all the world of culture in which I live and act; it is the real existence of nature assimilated by man, every detail of which signifies for me that which it objectively represents. In other words, my mental world is, in fact, the being, the existence of which I am aware.” (Mikhailov 1980, 141-142.) Cognition is realized as concrete interaction between embodied beings and their natural and cultural environment.

Another consequence is that logic is not only about forms of (natural or artificial) languages. It is about forms of action. Ilyenkov refers here also to G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx. The topic of logic is not thinking as symbolic activity but thinking as activity that changes the object. Logic is about history of science and technology. For Hegel logic is, according to Ilyenkov, manifested in deeds and acts. The products of work like machines, devices and so on are a medium of the existence of thought. (Ilyenkov 1984, 117-121.) In other words, thinking is activity that is expressed in invariant schemes of action. Logic is the logic experiencing the world in actual practice that changes the world. This can be seen as a development of Spinoza’s views, who describes in his essay On the Improvement of the Understanding how we can get exact knowledge of our nature and nature in general. We have to collect the differences, the agreements and the oppositions of things, to learn thus how far they can or cannot be modified and to compare this result with the nature and power of man. This is the way to discern the highest degree of perfection to which man is capable of attaining. (Spinoza 1955, 10.)

Jean Piaget on sensorimotor schemes

Piaget’s psychological theory emphasizes the significance of motor action. A sensorimotor scheme is, according to Piaget, an organized series of motor acts that is formed by reiterating action in the same or similar circumstances (Piaget & Inhelder 1969, 4). This is, by the way, very similar to the definition of a habit of action given by Charles Peirce. According to Peirce habits are acquired as consequences of the principle that “multiple reiterated behaviour of the same kind, under similar combinations of percepts and fancies, produces a tendency – the habit – actually to behave in a similar way under similar circumstances in the future” (CP 5.487).

The sensorimotor schemes are genetically and cognitively independent and basic in regard to perceiving and thinking.  They are formed during the child’s early development in the course of sensorimotor interaction with the physical environment. Perceptions are regarded as subschemes integrated into the sensorimotor schemes. For example, the visual perceptions of the Pavlov’s dog are integrated into a reflex scheme (Piaget 1971, 179). Further, the structures of higher cognition are formed and organized on the basis of the sensorimotor structures. The child’s concept of permanent object is based on the ability to manipulate the material objects. Visual coordination takes place on the ground of the sensorimotor scheme of grasping. Also logical operations have their ground on the properties of the sensorimotor schemes or “practical intelligence” (Piaget 1980, 164-165). The extensive use of notions like practical intelligence, practical concepts and logic of action entail that also for Piaget logic is not only about symbolic operations but action and practice (for further details see Määttänen 1993).





Schemes are methods for realizing the constitutive synthesis of pure understanding. Synthesis constitutes the nature as a possible object of experience. The origin of this idea is in the method of analysis and synthesis (resolution and composition) that stems from antiquity. In the Middle Ages it was the central method of experimental science. On this account analysis is tracking the causes of phenomena and synthesis gives the explanation of the phenomena by deducing it from their causes (Crombie 1953, 317-319). Scientific knowledge of phenomena is demonstrative knowledge of their causes (ibid., 52-53). In this sense science is synthetic knowledge.

Thomas Hobbes defined philosophy as knowledge about phenomena that is based on knowledge about their causes or origin (Hobbes 1962, 3). Also certain knowledge about geometric figures is possible because of the fact that we construct them. Hobbes uses the example of how we know whether a circle is a true circle or not. Sense perception alone is not enough for this. But if one knows that the curve is drawn with a solid body by pinning its one end and letting the other end draw the curve, then one knows for certain that it is a true circle (ibid., 6). Hobbes thus based the possibility of knowledge on the method of synthesis. Spinoza continued this tradition by maintaining that the only way to get true knowledge about phenomena is to acquire knowledge about its proximate cause (Spinoza 1955, 8, 11 and 34). Spinoza uses the same example of a circle. The adequate idea of the circle expresses the proximate cause of it, how it is constructed. The only difference is that Hobbes’ solid body is changed to a line (ibid., 35 and 395).

Kant used the concept of the scheme in solving the problem of the connection between concepts and corresponding objects. How are objects subsumed under concepts? This is problematic because concepts are purely intellectual and objects purely sensible, and therefore they have nothing in common. There must be some kind of mediator, and the schemes of pure understanding take care about this. What are these schemes? The chapter about schematism is short and open to different interpretations. I have defended an interpretation that is based on how the Kantian schemes solve the problems of subsumption that remained unsolved in earlier philosophy. This interpretation is closely related to how Piaget and Ilyenkov use the notion. Shortly, schemes are methods of construction processes that proceed in space and time; they are ways of constructing sensible representatives of the concepts of pure understanding (Määttänen 1983, 1988, 1973 and 2011).

John Locke considered the problem of how ideas in the mind are related to external objects. The significant background assumption of this way of posing the problem is Descartes’ dualism: mind and matter are different substances. According to Locke the connection between ideas and objects is realized through sense perception. Originally the mind is tabula rasa, and the ideas are formed on the ground of perceptions. The idea of the triangle is formed on the ground of various perceptions of different triangles. According to Locke, the connection between all simple ideas and their objects is based on conformity, and so is it with triangles (Locke 1959, II, 230). It follows from the principle of conformity (coincidence of forms) that the idea of the triangle is triangular and that the idea of the circle is circular (Locke 1959, I, 175).

The principle of conformity created a problem for Locke. In order to explain the connection between the idea of the triangle and different triangles in the world with this principle he had to postulate a general idea of the triangle that is “neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once” (Locke 1959, II, 274). Well, Locke could not imagine this kind of general triangle, and neither did George Berkeley who then concluded that abstract ideas simply do not exist (Berkeley 1994, 246-247, 253). This problem was called the one-many problem.

Kant solved the problem with his Copernican revolution and the concept of the scheme. The Copernican revolution tells that the direction of sense perception is not from the object of knowledge to the subject of knowledge but the other way round. Perceptions are active and constructive processes. The concept of the triangle gives the schematic method of constructing different triangles in different places at different times. This is simple, put three points on a plane and connect them with lines. Different realizations of this scheme are able to produce all kinds of triangles. Just put the dots differently. The relation between one concept and its different objects is in no way problematic. The one-many problem simply vanishes.





Ilyenkov regards general schemes as logical parameters and refers to Hegel’s notion of concrete generality (Ilyenkov 1984, 120-123). The form of the activity of a thinking body is general (ibid., 38). He has also written extensively about the ideal as the form of activity (ibid., 168 ff). But what is generality? What are the so-called universals?

There are various conceptions of generality. Nominalists deny the existence of universals, some realists have maintained the view that they are some kind of “immaterial general particulars”, whatever that may mean. Kant pointed out that generality is continuous activity (stetige Handlung, Kant 1926, 615). For Kant mental entities are not immaterial units in a container called mind but mental functions are acts (see Wolff 1963, 323). Charles Peirce says that Kant is a sort of pragmatist, although a “confused one” (CP 5.525). One reason for this characterization may be that Kant and Peirce had similar ideas about generality.

Peirce  was a realist saying that “real generals” do exist. But how? As mentioned above Peirce’s definition of the habit of action is the same as Piaget’s definition of the sensorimotor scheme. According to Peirce habits are beliefs as well as meanings. For this the habits must involve generality. Activity proceeds in time; therefore it makes sense to ask how generality is related to time. Note that Kant defined schemes as transcendental time determinations (KrV A 138-139/B 177-178). Time is (with space) for Kant a pure form of sensibility. Schemes are then a way to explain the connection between concepts and processes proceeding in space and time.

For Peirce habits consist of repeated individual acts. Similar action is repeated in similar circumstances, and this similarity between courses of action is generality. This repeated structure (form, scheme) is the mode of existence of generality. These acts are real processes in this real world in which we live. So there are real generals. The connection to time may be asked, as Peirce did, by asking when they exist. In the past there cannot be genuine generality because, for live creatures, in the past there can be only some definite number of instances of any habit. There can be only one instance of a habit in time, and therefore generality cannot exist now. So there remains only the possibility that generality exists in the future. Peirce writes:

For every habit has, or is, a general law. Whatever is truly general refers to the indefinite future; for the past contains only a certain collection of such cases that have occurred. The past is actual fact. But a general (fact) cannot be fully realized. It is a potentiality; and its mode of being is esse in futuro. The future is potential, not actual. (CP 2.148.)

It is important to note that Peirce speaks about indefinite future instead of infinite future. Peirce agrees with Kant that concepts can be applied to experience only. According to Kant the question of the beginning of time and that of the ultimate border of space are not meaningful because it would require the application of concepts over infinity. This is impossible for finite creatures like human beings. In contemporary mathematical terms one can say that only potential, not actual infinity can be within the scope of concepts. Consider natural numbers. Number n can be indefinitely big. But it can always be exceeded by adding number one to it. So there is no definite upper limit. This is potential infinity. However, the actually infinite set of all natural numbers is not accessible to concepts that are applied in experience.

Keeping this in mind one can say that Peirce’s real generals are only potentially, not actually general entities. Human experience is only capable of potential generality. This is consistent with Peirce’s terminology. Because generality is never actualised it can only be thought of. Generals can only be objects of thought. So there is a genuine realm of thought. However, Cartesian dualism does not follow because all possible future acts take place in this material world. Generality, or the ideal, exists as forms (schemes, habits) of activity in this world, just like Il’enkov put it. The ideal “exists as human being’s ability to act” (Ilyenkov 1984, 172). The ideal existence of things is not different from the real existence of things (ibid., 172-173). Descartes and Kant tried to solve the problem of the relation between ideas (concepts) and their objects by assuming that the ideal and the sensible have nothing in common. In Spinoza’s and Ilyenkov’s view this is not the case.

The object of thought is the ability to act. Or, in other words, thinking is anticipation of action (Määttänen 2009 and 2010). “What particularly distinguishes a general belief, or opinion, such as is an inferential conclusion, from other habits, is that it is active in the imagination” (CP 2.148). For Peirce general beliefs are habits that are active in the imagination. According to Ilyenkov thinking is “the ability to construct and reconstruct actively the schemes of overt action” (Ilyenkov 1984, 40). All these phrases amount to the same: The world is experienced as possibilities of action (or affordances, to use J.J. Gibson’s term). These future possibilities are thought of and evaluated on the ground of past practical experiences, and this thinking is manifested in the concrete interaction between human beings and their natural and cultural environment.

Questioning the internal/external dichotomy

Locke’s epistemological problem was to explain the connection between objects in the world and ideas on the mind. He applied the principle on conformity and concluded the idea of the circle is circular and the idea on the triangle is triangular. The problem was posed in the Cartesian framework where the dichotomy between internal and external is the starting point. Ideas are “in” the mind and the objects “out there”. One background idea behind this line of thought was knowledge about the eye functioning like camera obscura. External objects create retinal images inside the eye, and this image is somehow changed into a mental image. On this view, ideas and objects resemble each other. 

Spinoza is of a different opinion. He writes “by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought” (Spinoza 1955, 120). He calls ideas images of things but “they do not recall the figure of things” (ibid., 100). He explains that “an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no wise involve the conception of thought” (ibid., 122). On this view, ideas and objects simply cannot resemble each other, which is quite understandable. Suppose, for the argument’s sake, that some kind of servomechanism in the brain controls the hand’s movements along a round object. Does it make sense to ask whether this servomechanism is round?

Ilyenkov changes the framework of the problem. Locke required conformity between ideas in the mind and objects in the external world, but Ilyenkov considers the relation between the form of the object and the form of activity, the form of the concrete interaction between a human being and objects in the world. This form of activity cannot, strictly speaking, “reside” in the brain. It exists as forms of concrete activity. All talk about something’s being “in the head” is purely metaphorical and colloquial. Mind is not a property of the brain or even the body. Mind is a property of the interaction between living creatures and their environment (see Mikhailov 1980, 141-142).

The form of activity may be somewhat misleading notion. For example, when talking about a hand moving along a round object one might come to the conclusion that it is about the hand’s circular movement. This is too simplistic. The form of activity is about the ability to act, about the whole body’s organs, states and processes that make the activity possible. The example about circular movement is too simplistic also in the sense that most of human activity is not just accommodation to the material world’s spatial properties. Here we can refer to Spinoza once again. To have exact knowledge we must learn how far the objects can or cannot be modified and “compare this result with the nature and power of man” (Spinoza 1955, 10). The world is modified with the help of the body with its organs, but the tools, instruments, machines and so on are also involved in the interaction. The notion of the form of activity refers to all this.

Ilyenkov is not the first one to question the dichotomy between internal and external. Charles Peirce was a consistent and sharp critic of Descarte’s philosophy and his conception about habits of action as beliefs and meanings and, therefore, as vehicles of cognition are best understood as structures (forms, schemes) of interaction (Määttänen 2010). Peirce distinguished between action and perception by saying that in perception the world’s influence on us is greater that our influence on the world, and in action this is the other way round. Action and perception form a kind of mental loop (Määttänen 2009). John Dewey criticized as early as 1896 the concept of the reflex arc and suggested that this concept should be replaced by that of sensorimotor circuit (Dewey 1975). This can be expressed by saying that the external objects belong to “the functional organization of mind” (Määttänen 1993, 105). Mind and consciousness emerge in the concrete interaction between living beings and their environment.

This pragmatic view of experience differs essentially from empiricism where the sense organs form a kind of channel connecting the internal mind to the external world. In empiricism the object of experience and knowledge consists of perceived properties and the relations between perceived states of affairs. David Hume famously went so far as to say that causal relations and values are not facts in the world because one cannot literally perceive them. If action is involved in the very definition of experience then the definition of the object of experience changes.

The world is experienced as possibilities of future action. The object of experience is the relation between the present situation and the anticipated future situation that is the probably outcome of acting according to some habit (form or scheme) of action. The object of experience is thus the relation between two experienced situations, and this relation is mediated by some form of activity. This is the best way to get action into the definition of the object of experience (and knowledge). This change in the notion of experience has some important consequences.

As Ilyenkov points out, there can be no causal relation between thought and bodily behaviour (Ilyenkov 1984, 30). Indeed, to take the brain to be the organ that thinks (in the head) by itself and causes external bodily behaviour is just a form of Neo-Cartesianism (see Bennett & Hacker 2003). The dichotomy of external and internal must be rejected, and the pragmatic definition of the object of experience takes care about it. This definition, with the view that mind is the property of interaction, leads to the following conception about the causes of bodily behaviour.

Needs and desires can be understood as internal bodily states, but they alone are not causes of behaviour. An organism may be hungry, but it is impossible to eat without the presence of some food. Perceiving the food is another cause, but even this is not enough to explain behaviour. The world is experienced as possibilities of activity. The anticipated outcome of eating, namely the satisfaction of hunger, is the desired future experience towards which the organism decides to act. The actual eating, the realization of the scheme of eating, is itself a manifestation of thought. It makes no sense to say that this manifestation of thought is the cause of itself. The behaviour is caused by a complex system of causal relations between the organism and its environment. There is no one cause that could be singled out as the cause of activity. (See Määttänen 2009.)The framework of the very posing of the problem of mind as the cause of bodily activity is Cartesian, and this framework is here rejected altogether.

Several contemporary authors maintain similar views. According to Merlin Donald (2002) human mind is hybrid. The body with its brain is not enough. The brain is not a device for manipulating symbols. Symbols are in the environment, and human mind emerges in the interaction with the various symbolic systems. The hybrid mind consists of the brain in a live body and external symbols. Alva Noë’s (2009) title Out of Our Heads is informative in itself. According to Noë consciousness does not reside in the brain, it is something we do. Timo Järvilehto (1998) investigates organism-environment systems, Andy Clark (1997) wants to put the brain, the body and the world together again. This list could be continued. The significance of the activity for cognition is receiving growing attention.

Dialectic, logic and epistemology

Ilyenkov puts forward the thesis that dialectic, logic and the theory of knowledge, epistemology, are the same. The meaning of this claim depends, of course, what one means by these terms. Each of them requires some discussion.

Traditional epistemology is the study of the prerequisites of knowledge. It has been considered to be a priori conceptual analysis that is independent of the world and our experience of it. Reason is categorically separated from the world. Spinoza criticized this Cartesian dualism. This dualism is quite questionable also from the viewpoint of the theory of evolution. How did one animal species get this remarkable power to transcend nature? Various naturalistic approaches have denied this possibility since the end of 19th century.

In philosophical naturalism one can distinguish between two sorts of approaches, soft naturalism and hard naturalism (Määttänen 2006). John Dewey maintained simply that culture is a product of nature, a phenomenon developed by one animal species. This is soft naturalism.  Willard van Orman Quine bases his naturalism on a conception of natural science, hard science, so to say. In the present context the most important difference between these approaches is that Quine supports reductionism (mind is reduced to the brain) while Dewey lays stress on the concrete interaction between live creatures and their environment (recall the notion of the sensorimotor circuit). What they have in common is the denial of any strictly aprioristic epistemology. According to Quine epistemology is a chapter of  empirical psychology (considered as a branch of natural science). Dewey challenged the whole epistemological tradition by developing a view he called experimental empiricism or instrumentalism (stressing the role of scientific instruments and devices in acquiring knowledge). This is epistemology as a general theory of (practical) experience.

Also in Ilyenkov’s materialism there is no room for a priori conceptual analysis that would be independent of the world and our experience of it. This follows immediately from the position that the ideal exists as forms (schemes) of activity. Consistent materialism cannot assume any kind of faculty of reason that would function entirely independently of our practical existence in this world, and this kind of faculty is necessary for a priori conceptual analysis. Language is sometimes considered to be a vehicle for such analysis, but for Ilyenkov language itself is not ideal (and neither are neural processes), it is only a way to express the ideal (Ilyenkov 1984, 171). The conclusion is the same as in Dewey’s naturalism. Epistemology is a general theory of experience, theory of knowledge acquisition.

Logic is a general theory of thought. However, what logic turns out to be depends on what one takes thought to be.  Thought as the use of language, manipulation of symbols, leads to the view of logic as a formal theory of symbol manipulation. Ilyenkov, however, refers to Hegel and maintains that traditional logical theories do not describe thought that is realized as science investigating the world (ibid., 114). As noted above the topic of logic is the history of science and technology. Logical form is the form of action (ibid., 119). The general schemes are the parameters of logic (ibid., 120). Logic is, on this view, a general theory of the scientific investigation of the world. In other words, logic is about the right way of experiencing the world. The topic of logic and the topic of epistemology are thus the same, at least generally speaking.

Here, again, there is a connection with the pragmatism of Peirce and Dewey. Peirce is a prominent figure in formal logic, but this is not the whole story. A habit is for him a final logical interpretant (CP 5.591). Habit formation is the way to acquire general conclusions by practical experience. The habit formation in itself is a form of inductive inference (CP 6.145). Induction as a formal procedure is “the logical formula which expresses the physiological process of formation of a habit” (CP 2.643). Dewey published in 1938 the book Logic, The Theory of Inquiry. The title speaks for itself. In classical pragmatism logic is closely connected with habitual action and scientific inquiry.
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